Amsterdam, NL (May 7 th -9 th ) DFRWS is dedicated to the sharing of knowledge and ideas about digital forensics research. Ever since it organized the first open workshop devoted to digital forensics in 2001, DFRWS continues to bring academics and practitioners together in an informal environment.
Introduction
The proliferation of smartphones and tablet computers has significant implications for digital investigations. As the usage of mobile devices continues to expand, so will the proportion of digital evidence retrieved from these devices as compared to computer hard disks. According to Marturana et al. (2011) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (2001) it is more likely that law enforcement will encounter a suspect with a mobile device in his/her possession than a PC or laptop. Hence studying these devices from a forensic perspective is an essential task for both researchers and practitioners in digital forensics. Casey (2013) discussed smartphone forensic R&D and training, and indicated that the variety of hardware and operating systems in smartphones makes the forensic acquisition and analysis of these devices significantly different from the computers with which most forensic practitioners are familiar. This equally applies to tablets and other small scale devices, which are equally heterogeneous as their smartphone cousins. The variety of file systems, data structures and the number of third party applications available on some of these devices makes the realm of digital forensic research a significantly more complicated environment. This complication is highlighted by the diversity of research done on different devices as well as the changes in the operating systems or hardware of previously studied devices.
This research addresses Windows RT tablets, such as the Surface RT, from a digital forensic acquisition and analysis perspective. Windows RT is a variant of the Windows 8 operating system designed for mobile devices that utilize the ARM architecture. It is optimized for thin and light PCs that have extended battery life. It is only available pre-installed on selected tablets and PCs such as the ASUS VivoTab RT, Dell XPS 10, Lenovo Idea-Pad Yoga 11, Samsung ATIV Tab, and Surface RT. Windows RT only runs built-in apps or apps that are downloaded from the Windows Store, while other apps such as Adobe Photoshop, and legacy programs that run on the regular Windows operating system cannot run on it. However, Windows RT still has a limited desktop mode where the user can use redesigned office applications such as Word, Excel and PowerPoint as well as exploring and arranging folders in a manner similar to the regular desktop mode. This paper identifies a forensically sound acquisition method for a Windows RT device, and describes the file system structure and potential forensic artifacts. It is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss related research in small scale digital device forensics, and then in the Methodology section we discuss our general methodology. Followed by the Acquisition section which describes Windows RT acquisition, then in the Analysis section we discuss analysis of acquired Windows RT images. This paper concludes with a synopsis of findings and planned future work in this area.
Related work
The field of small scale device forensics has challenged researchers because the diversity of hardware and operating systems of these devices requires different methods of forensic acquisition and analysis. According to Casey (2013) this is shown in "The effects of switching the camera module from Blackberry Curve 9360 devices" by Gisolf et al., which deals with the changes in the hardware of Blackberry Curve 9360 devices. As well with the work of Quick & Choo who investigated the artifacts left by Dropbox on a Windows 7 computer and an Apple iPhone 3G hence study the effect of a third party application and its relation to the cloud (Casey, 2013 Gisolf et al., 2013 , Quick and Choo, 2013 .
As a new tablet operating system, Windows RT has gained the interest of a number of researchers. According to reports, a hacker named C.L. Rokr (clrokr) has found a way to bypass the code integrity checking in Windows RT which allows users to run unsigned code on Surface tablets and other devices, effectively jailbreaking the platform (Windows RT jailbroken, 2013) . This approach could also be utilized for forensic acquisition of these devices. The method is possible because most of the Windows RT code has been ported directly from Windows 8. This porting included a byte in the kernel that sets the minimum signing level for code execution. On Windows 8, this is set to 0 so that any code can be run, but on Windows RT, it is set to 8, meaning that code must be signed by Microsoft in order to run. Lock and Code Pty Ltd have developed software that will jailbreak the Windows RT device using the method described by clrokr, then use a set of acquisition tools to acquire an image of the device (Freestone, 2013) .
As mentioned above Windows RT has some similarities with Windows 8 and as a result, we looked at some of the work done with regard to this operating system. Amanda Thomson studied forensic artifacts left on Windows 8 Consumer Preview 32-bit Edition in order to create a guide book for forensic examiners (Thomson, 2012) . Using FTK Imager v3.0.1 Thomson imaged the VM where Windows 8 is installed and then utilized EnCase Forensic v6.17 for examination and analysis. The artifacts described by Thomson included information about Apps that are displayed on the Metro interface, as well as web cache and cookies specific to Metro Apps. Around the same time, Ethan Fleisher investigated the effect of Reset and Refresh function in Windows 8 (Fleisher, 2012) . This feature allows a user to choose whether or not to reinstall the OS, quickly reset their entire computer, or thoroughly reset their entire computer. Hence, the reset operation may cause the machine to be wiped of all data and for that reason it is important for digital forensic researchers to investigate the artifacts left after utilizing this feature. Fleisher was able to find artifacts indicating that this feature was utilized as well as other artifacts about the reset or refreshed system. Kaart, Klaver and van Baar stated that Windows 8, which is developed to run on mobile devices, such as tablets and phones, as well as on traditional devices such as laptops and desktop computers, might still have some of the files from the Windows Phone 7 operating system (Kaart et al., 2013) . In their work they reverse-engineered significant parts of the EDB (Microsoft Embedded Database) volume format and extensively analyzed the pim.vol file that contains information related to contacts, appointments, call history, speed-dial settings and tasks. They also implemented a parser for the EDB volume format structure and compared their results to the traditional approach using an emulator and the API provided by the Windows CE operating system. The parser was able to recover additional databases, additional properties per record and unallocated records. Schaefer, Höfken and Schuba discussed the acquisition and analysis of a Windows Phone 7 device (Schaefer et al., 2012) . Their work explains the main characteristics of the platform, the problems that forensic investigators face, methods to circumvent those problems and a set of tools to get data from the phone. Data that can be acquired from the phone include the file system, the registry and active tasks. Based on the file system, further information such as SMSs, Emails and Facebook data can be extracted (Schaefer et al., 2012) .
From this initial search we identified that there is not sufficient scientific work that discusses Windows RT tablets from a digital forensic perspective. The main aim of our work will be to investigate the artifacts left on the device as well as acquiring an image of it.
Methodology
The main purpose of this research is to forensically investigate the Surface RT tablet which runs the Windows RT operating system. This tablet may contain valuable forensic artifacts, as it combines the traditional tablet application environment with common office productivity applications such as Word, PowerPoint and Excel. Alongside this is the use of the traditional Windows Explorer (File Explorer) available in the regular Windows Operating System. These desktop-style features in conjunction with the mobility and the availability of a full size USB port and MicroSD card, mean that this device may contain a wealth of forensic artifacts.
As the main purpose of this research is to forensically investigate the device, ensuring the integrity of the gathered artifacts is an essential requirement. This requirement is important not only in the case of a forensic investigation but also for forensic researchers to validate the acquisition that has been undertaken and the analysis of the acquired image. For that reason the test and examination procedure was derived from the Computer Forensics Tool Testing program guidelines established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (2001) . This section of the paper will discuss the test environment for this research as well as the requirements to create such an environment and perform the test. Along with that, a discussion of the preformed scenario will be detailed which will assist in determining the expected artifacts that could be found on the device.
Test environment and requirements
As stated in the NIST guidelines, all the tools and devices used to create the test environment should be listed. Detailed below is a list of devices and analysis tools used in this investigation: Prior to conducting the experiment a lab computer was set up to run all the analysis tools listed above. All system applications running on the Surface RT device were updated after the user account setup. The configuration was not modified during the setup of the device.
Test procedure
The test procedure consisted of three stages which were creating a fictional scenario, acquiring an image of the device and finally analyzing that image.
Scenario
This stage involves conducting common user activity such as browsing the Internet, using the camera and uploading images to SkyDrive.
A fictional scenario was developed for the purpose of conducting the investigation. A Microsoft account was created using fictional information. This account was created because installing applications, using SkyDrive features and sync features require a Microsoft Account. Table 1 contains the information used for creation of the account.
After the creation of the account, we performed a number of "normal" activities on the tablet. Selecting activities which we supposed were typical for the device based on the available applications, we simulated user activity on the device. Table 2 shows the simulated user activity on the device.
Acquisition
This stage involved the acquisition of an image of the device using a custom data acquisition tool that was compiled for Windows RT on the ARM platform. A base image was acquired after the creation of user account and this was analyzed for system related artifacts. Our acquisition technique is discussed in section four, below. After each activity a new image was acquired from the device Table 1 Information used for the creation of the account.
Input Value
First Name John Last Name Doe Email Address m80003052@zu.ac.ae Password Testing1 Listened to a radio station, Artist "coldplay" Note: During the process a Microsoft Xbox account was automatically created.
Calendar
Added a new calendar event Weather
Added a new weather city "Seoul, South Korea" Bing Searched for keywords "security", "forensics" and "digital forensics" Skype Added contact "asifiqbal.ai" Initiated a text chat session with "asifiqbal.ai" Initiated a video chat with "asifiqbal.ai" Store Searched for and installed Skype app from the Windows Store and compared to the base image, the changes were then analyzed and reported.
Analysis
This stage involved the analysis of the image acquired during the acquisition stage. As mentioned above, several images were created and analyzed, and compared to a base image. A description of the analysis and associated findings is provided in the analysis section below.
Acquisition
One of the first steps in any forensic investigation is acquiring an image of the device. A forensic image is acquired to ensure the integrity of the original evidence.
The acquisition process we employed was accomplished utilizing a kernel-level vulnerability in the Windows Driver Signature Enforcement mechanism, which has existed in Microsoft Windows on the PC for some time now. Since Windows RT is a port of Windows 8 to the ARM platform. This vulnerability was also ported to the Surface RT tablet and was employed by CL Rokr (aka 'clrokr') in order to jailbreak Windows RT (Windowsjailbroken et al., 2013) .
The minimum signing level determines how trusted an executable's signature is on the scale: Unsigned (0), Authenticode (4), Microsoft (8), and Windows (12) . The default value on x86 machines is 0, to allow a user to run anything they like on their computer. On ARM machines, the default is set to 8. This is not a user setting, but a hardcoded global value in the kernel itself. It cannot be changed permanently on devices with UEFI's (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) Secure Boot enabled. It can, however, be changed in memory.
By adapting the technique mentioned above, the value of signing level is set to Unsigned (0). This allows execution of unsigned applications.
We used the Windows Volume Shadow Copy service to acquire an image of the device's disk. For this purpose a Cþþ program was written to use VSS (Volume Shadow Copy Service) APIs to copy all of the disk's content.
Analysis
After setting up the user account on the device, a base image of the device was created. A predefined set of activities were then performed on the device, as detailed in Table 3 The structure of metro application data directory.
Directory Content

AC INetCache
The cache file is stored in randomly named sub-directories. Cache files retain their original filename and extension.
INetCookies
Cookies are stored in this Directory with cookies for each website stored in a single textfile with random name LocalState This directory can be directly accessed by the application and can be used to permanently store any type of data.
Settings
Application settings are stored in this directory as Registry Hive (regf) files. These files can be analyzed using yaru
Non-Metro application artifacts recovered
One of the interesting artifacts recovered from the Surface RT tablet was the password of the user's online and offline account. We were able to recover this artifact because the information from the user's online Microsoft account is used in the local Windows user account. The local account also shares the password of the online account of the user. Since Windows stores password hashes of the local account in SAM file located in %WINDOWS %/System32/config directory, the content of this directory were investigated. The Ophcrack tool was used to decode the SAM file found on the device, where the password of the user's online and offline account was successfully recovered (see Fig. 1 ). More complex passwords could be recovered using the Rainbow tables (Marechal, 2008) .
Other useful non-Metro artifacts retrieved from the device were photos and videos taken on the device itself. All the photos and videos taken on the device itself were stored in the (%userprofile%\Pictures\Camera Roll\) directory, where the variable (%userprofile%) stands for (C:\Users\%User Name%\). The retrieved photos were stored in JPEG format while the videos were stored in MP4 file format.
Analysis of Metro application artifacts
Metro applications do not have direct access to the file system and all of their content is stored under (%userprofile %\AppData\Local\Packages\%Application Name%_%id%). Table 3 details the structure of the Metro application data directory.
Camera Application
Artifacts left by the Camera Metro application were found in the directory "Microsoft.Camera_8wekyb3d8bbwe" under the package's directory. The Registry hive "settings.dat" was found under the Settings directory (see . Table 4 details the data found inside the settings registry hive.
Photo application
The photos application displays not only the local photos stored in the Pictures directory in the user's home directory but also online photos stored in user's SkyDrive. All the online SkyDrive photos are cached to the expected INetCache directory under the package directory (microsoft.windowsphotos_8wekyb3d8bbwe). As mentioned previously these files retain their original file-names. The photos uploaded during the case study phase of the experiment were recovered from randomly named directories under INETCache directory.
SkyDrive application
Data related to files uploaded to SkyDrive using the application was found in the directory (LocalState\bt\up-loads\%User ID%\) under the package directory (microsoft.microsoftskydrive_ 8wekyb3d8bbwe). See Fig. 6 . The data is stored in xml files with GUID as file-name. The following are the nodes that are of interest: transferGUID: Unique ID of the transaction, this id is also used in filename.
UserCid: Unique ID of user's Microsoft account, this is previouly mentioned as variable %User ID%. FileName: Name of file on local system, this will also be used as name of the file on SkyDrive servers. destinationGroup: Name of the directory files is to be sent to on SkyDrive server.
Bing search
Bing search artifacts were recovered from randomly named subdirectories of the INetCache directory in the Bing package directory (Microsoft.Bing_8wekyb3d8bbwe). The files recovered were cached files of page search.htm, which is called when a new search term is entered. The cache directories also held several image files that were 
Analysis of Internet Explorer artifacts
Internet Explorer browser session artifacts were recovered from (%userprofile%\AppData\Local\Micro-soft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\). Table 5 details the structure of "Recovery" directory.
Using the data found in these files, a timeline of the user's activity in the last browsing session was established see Fig. 10 .
Analysis of the Property Set in the file {B87DD755-DFF0-11E2-90F1-FA7A0AAA4087}.dat indicated the last destination of the user was the page titled "About the University" with a corresponding URL www.zu.ac.ae/main/ en/explore_zu/index.aspx see Fig. 11 .
The stream titled TabImage held the thumbnail preview image. This image was stored in Microsoft's proprietary format "Windows Media Photo" (WMPHOTO). This stream was saved as binary data and was viewed using image viewing software IrfanView see Fig. 12 By analyzing the streams (TL%Number%) it was found that on opening the browser, the user was directed to the default page MSN UAE (http://uae.msn.com/? rd¼1&dcc¼AE&opt¼0). The user then navigated to Zayed University website's main page (http://www.zu.ac.ae/ main/en). And from there, finally, to Zayed University website's "About University" page (http://www.zu.ac.ae/ main/en/explore_zu/index.aspx) see Similar analysis was done on second file {B87DD756-DFF0-11E2-90F1-FA7A0AAA4087}.dat which represented a second browser tab see Fig. 16 .
All the information recovered during this analysis was found to be consistent with the case study conducted in the first stage of the experiment.
Conclusion and future work
The field of digital forensics is developing with the innovation of new devices. In this research we have studied the forensics of the Windows Surface RT tablet, which runs the Windows RT operating system. Utilizing a vulnerability in Windows RT code, we were able to perform the acquisition of the device. 1 There are a range of artifacts that could be considered as evidence when forensically investigating a Surface RT device. These artifacts can be divided as non-Metro application artifacts and Metro application artifacts. In terms of non-Metro application artifacts, an interesting artifact that was retrieved was the user's online and offline account password. In terms of Metro Application artifacts, we were able to retrieve information about, for example, the Camera Application, the Photos Application, SkyDrive and Bing Searches.
With regard to future work, we plan to utilize the information gathered in this research to develop a tool that will automate the process of acquisition and analysis of a Surface RT device. Other possible future work is to compare the artifacts from the Surface RT with those from other Windows RT devices to determine whether there are any differences in the data stored on the device and their structure. 
